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ARTICLES
A TALE OF TWO ISLANDS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
COURT OF ARBITRATION'S DECISION IN THE
CANADA-FRANCE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE
EDWARD LlVINGSTONEt

In carrying out the delimitation of the maritime boundary dispute between
Canada and the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Court of
Arbitration was instructed by the parties to apply principles of international
law. The majoriry of the Court interpreted this instruction as demanding the
application of equitable criteria to achieve an equitable result. The inconsistencies in the Court's judgment, however, suggest that the majority relied on
the principle ofproportionaliry, and not on equitable criteria, in delimiting
the boundary. Analyzed from a functional perspective, the decision represents
an attempt by the Court to produce both a settlement and a demand far cooperation in the management of the maritime resources at the heart of the
dispute.

Lorsque le Tribunal d'arbitrage decida du litige entre le Canada et les ties
franfaises de St. Pierre et Miquelon quant a la delimitation des ftontieres
maritimes, les parties indiquerent qu 'elles voulaient etre regies par les
principes de droit international La majorite du Tribunal interprete ces in structions comme autorisant !'application des principes d'equite afin d'obtenir
un resulta equitable. Cependant, les inconsistances du jugement du Tribunal
suggerent que la majorite se fonde sur le principe de la proportionnalite lors
de la delimitation des ftontieres, et non sur les criteres d'equite. En
l'analysant d'une perspective fonctionnelle, la decision represente une
tentative du Tribunal d'en arriver autant a une entente qu 'a une demande
de cooperation des parties a l'egard de !'administration des ressources
maritimes en litige.

t B.Sc. (Concordia), M.Sc. (Guelph), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
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I. INTRODUCTION

On June 10th 1992 the Court of Arbitration established by Canada
and France to settle their maritime boundary dispute with respect
to the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon rendered its decision, 1
putting an end, on the face of it, to over twenty years of acrimonious
dispute. In the agreement which sent the matter to judicial
arbitration, the two countries specified that the Court should rule
"in accordance with the principles and rules of international law
applicable in the matter." 2 It is claimed by the majority of the
Court of Arbitration that by using equitable criteria to arrive at an
equitable result this requirement has been fulfilled.
This paper is an assessment of the judgment both in light of
current international law and juridical thought on maritime boundary delimitation, as well as in terms of its legal and logical coherence. Each step of the decision is analyzed in order to draw out the
principles at work, legal or otherwise. To aid in this task use is
made of the dissenting opinions of the Canadian and French
members of the Court.
While clearly enunciating several equitable criteria upon which
to base the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court applies them in such a non-rigorous manner as to suggest a decision
that is based upon a proportionality concept. In the result the Court
balances uneasily between a stated rule of law and a decision rendered ex aequo et bono.
In addition to an analysis based on classical legal principles, the
decision of the court, as well as the dispute in general, will be considered from a functional perspective. In this regard discussion will
be centred both on the limits imposed on the Court by the compromis, and on any perceived functional aspects of the decision. It
will be argued that the boundary produced by the Court is deliberately constructed so as to impede control by any one party of the

1

Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada
and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas, 31
I.L.M. 1145 (1992).
2 Canada-France: Agreement Establishing a Court of Arbitration for the Purpose
of Carrying out the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between France and Canada.,
29 I.L.M. 1 (1990), art. 2(1) [hereinafter the compromis]. The compromis also sets
out the members of the court: Mr. Jimenez de Arechaga (pres.), Mr. ArangioRuiz, Mr. Schachter, Mr. Weil (France), Mr. Godieb (Canada).
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resources at the heart of the dispute, thereby increasing the probability and necessity of cooperative management.
The body of the paper consists of four sections. First, a historical and contemporary overview of the islands of St. Pierre and
Miquelon and the associated Canada-France dispute. Second, a description of the Court's decision, incorporating an analysis of specific issues raised both by the majority and dissenting opinions.
Third, a general analysis of the juridical framework used by the
Court to arrive at its decision; and fourth, a functionalist perspective on both the dispute and the judgment.
II.BACKGROUND

1. Historical Context
The dispute over the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon stretches
back almost 400 years to the establishment of the first French settlement in 1604. This was followed by the first British occupation
in 1702 with the islands subsequently being ceded to Great Britain
by the Treaty of Utrecht3 in 1713. 4 Under the Treaty of Paris5
of 1763 France regained the islands as her sole possession in what
had become British North America. The islands were granted to
France in fulfilment of a request that French fishermen be accorded
a place of shelter. 6
Between 1763 and 1816 the islands were occupied by the British
no less than four times, and four times France regained possession
under new treaty provisions. The most famous of these being the
Treaty of Versailles? of 1783 which was accompanied by declarations
from Great Britain and France stating that the islands should not
become "an object of jealousy between the two nations." 8
Throughout this period fishing activities by the French were a
constant source of aggravation between the two countries, princi3 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 11 April 1713, France-Great Britain, 27
Parry's TS 475.
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica Micropaedia (1984), vol. 10 at 333.
5 Definitive Treaty of Peace, 10 February 1763, France-Great Britain-Spain,
42 Parry's TS 279.
6 Ibid. art. VI.
7 Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 3 September 1783, France-Great
Britain, 48 Parry's TS 437.
8 Ibid.
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pally because the French did not restrict themselves to the waters in
the channel between St. Pierre and Miquelon but fished along a
considerable length of Newfoundland's coast. 9 More importantly,
France was developing a fishery based not in metropolitan France
but rather on the islands, with the result that St. Pierre and
Miquelon were no longer just a refuge, but rather a fully developed
colony.

2. The Present Dispute
The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon thus have a long and contentious history. The origin of the recent chain of events leading to
the Court of Arbitration, however, is found in communications by
Canada to France in 1966 10 proposing a delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between St. Pierre and Miquelon and Canada
on the basis of "special circumstances" under art. 6 of the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf. 11 In reply, France insisted on
the use of equidistance to delimit the boundary, using St. Pierre and
Miquelon as base-points with minor changes possible in the light of
"special circumstances." 12 This dispute was brought into sharp focus
later that year when both countries issued competing permits for
offshore oil & gas exploration on the continental shelf south of St.
Pierre and Miquelon.13
Talks on the delimitation of the shelf occurred periodically
over the next several years, with the delimitation of the territorial
sea also becoming an issue in 1971 with the extension by Canada
and France of their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles. 14 During
this period, Canada was attempting to terminate fishing by foreign
fleets in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as a result of which Canada and
France entered into the 1972 Agreement Between Canada and France

9 D. W. Prowse, "The Treaty Shore Question in Newfoundland" (1902) 1 Can.
L. Rev. 329 at 334.
1 Canada-France, Case Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Areas,
Canadian Memorial, 107-108, paras 236 and 237 [hereinafter
11 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UNTS 311.
12 French aide-memoire, July 29, 1966, Canada-France Case Concerning the
Delimitation ofMaritime Areas, Annexes to the Memorials, vol. 1 at Annex A-3.
l3 T. McDorman, "The Canada-France Maritime Boundary Case: Drawing a
Line Around St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1990) 84Am. J. Int'! L. 157 at 159.
14 Memorial, supra note 10 at 111, para. 252.
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on Their Mutual Fishing Relations. 15 The result of this agreement, as
it applies to St. Pierre and Miquelon, is threefold. First, it sets a
territorial sea boundary 16 in the channel between the islands and the
coast of Newfoundland. The line is primarily an equidistance one
and consists of eight straight line segments (see Figure 1). Second,
the agreement provides for reciprocal fishing rights in both
undisputed and disputed national waters, regardless of any
subsequent modifications to fishing zones-subject to the caveat
that Canada can impose such measures as are needed to conserve the
resource, such as quotas. 17 Finally, the agreement contains a "without
prejudice" clause enabling either country to make further claims in
the area. 18
While the two countries were agreeing on fisheries, progress was
also being made with regard to oil and gas resources. In 1972, a
Releve De Conclusions19 was arrived at by officials from both countries. In it France agreed to a limited continental shelf claim, not
spelled out, but indicated to be a 12 NM zone, in exchange forcertain economic concessions on the exploration and exploitation of
the offshore oil and gas resources. 20 This compromise was rejected
by the Canadian cabinet and died a quick death, but France latter
submitted the Releve to the Court of Arbitration in the AngloFrench Arbitration21 to support its contention that the Channel
Islands should be enclaved.
The delimitation dispute became somewhat more complicated
in 1977 when Canada and then France proclaimed a 200 NM fishing
zone (EFZ) and economic zone respectively (EEZ), 22 Negotiations
between the two countries commenced again in 1978, after the end
of the Anglo-French Arbitration, with France now claiming a strict
l5 Agreement Between Canada and France on Their Mutual Fishing Relations,
supra note 12, vol. 1 at Annex D-13 [hereinafter the 1972 Agreemenrj.
l6 Whether it is the territorial sea or a fisheries zone which is being delimited

is unclear.
17 1972 Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2.
l8 Ibid. art. 9.
19 Re/eve de conclusions, supra note 12, vol. 1 at Annex B-2 [hereinafter Relevej.
20 Ibid. arts. I & II.
21 Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, and the French Republic, 18
R.I.A.A. 3 [hereinafter Anglo-French Arbitration].

22 C. R. Symmons, "The Canadian 200-Mile Fishery Limit and the
Delimitation of Maritime Zones Around St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1980) 12
Ott. L. Rev. 145 at 152-4.
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equidistance line as the proper method of delimitation and Canada
insisting that France was entitled to no more than a 12 NM enclaved
zone around the islands. 23
Over the next decade, talks were started on numerous occasions
only to break down. While this period was marked by considerable
tension between the two countries, worse was yet to come. In the
mid-1980s, Canada started setting quotas for the cod catch in the
3Ps fishery subdivision, which included both the disputed zone as
well as undisputed Canadian waters. 24 Together with a private 1984
agreement that provided for national fisheries laws not to be
reciprocally applied in the disputed area, the imposition of quotas
was sufficient to bring the two countries back to the bargaining table
in 1987. Canada in particular was eager to resolve the boundary
dispute as it was concerned about the effects of unrestrained French
fishing-as allowed by the 1984 agreement-on the cod stocks that
migrated through the disputed waters. 25
The 1987 talks lead to an agreement in principle to send the
boundary dispute to arbitration, as well as setting quotas for undisputed Canadian waters and laying down a process for the joint development of quotas in the disputed zone pending resolution of the
dispute. 26 This last aspect of the agreement proved to be a complete
failure, resulting in Canada closing its ports to French fishing
vessels and France recalling its ambassador. 27 A mediator was
called in and in 1989 agreement was reached on quotas. In addition,
France agreed to send the boundary dispute to arbitration on the
basis of the compromis of March 30th, 1989 in return for a greater
allowable catch in undisputed Canadian waters. 28

3. Geographic and Political Environment
To fully understand the dispute and the judgment it is necessary to
understand the unique geographical and political situation of St.
Pierre and Miquelon. The islands are situated west and south of the
mouth to Fortune Bay, opposite the western coast of Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula. The grouping consists of two main
23

Memorial, supra note 10 at 116-117, paras. 262-6.
McDorman, supra note 13 at 161-2.
2 5 Memorial, supra note 10 at Figure 9.
26 McOorman, supra note 13 at 163.
2 7 Ibid. at 164.
28 Ibid.

24
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FIGURE 1

Delimitation as per 1972 Agreement
on Mutual Fishing Practices
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Adapted by Olivier Fuldauer from C. R. Symmons, "The Canadian 200-Mile
Fishery Limit and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones Around St. Pierre and
Miquelon" (1980) 12 Ott. L. Rev. 145at148.

8

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
FIGURE 2
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Adapted by Olivier Fuldauer from map by Dr. Galo Carrera, Professor Dawn
Russell, Professor Hugh Kindred, and Professor Phil Saunders, with permission of
Professor Phil Saunders.
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islands. The northern island, Miquelon, is actually two islands,
Grande Miquelon and Langlade 29 joined together by a sandy
isthmus. Neither of these islands have a significant population, the
total being approximately 800 people. Together, Grande Miquelon
and Langlade stretch for approximately 22 NM and are almost 7
NM wide for an area of 215 square kilometres. The southern island,
St. Pierre, is the main population centre with a population of approximately 6300. The island is 3 NM south-east of Miquelon and
has an area of 27 square kilometres. At its narrowest the channel between the Burin peninsula and St. Pierre is 9 NM wide.3°
The political situation of St. Pierre and Miquelon has changed
considerably since the dispute first arose between Canada and
France. Until 1976, the islands were considered to be French overseas territories. From that point until 1985, they were classified as a
departement of France, a change which brought them within the
European Economic Community legal regime. In 1985 their status
was changed once again to that of a territorial collectivity of
France. This change removed the islands from EEC jurisdiction3 1
and can be interpreted as being the first step on the road to
independence, though it should be noted that there is no other
evidence to suggest any great likelihood of this happening.3 2
III. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

1. The Relevant Area
The Court's first step is to describe the geographical area that it
considers relevant to the delimitation process. It does this before
addressing the international law applicable to the dispute (as dictated by the terms of reference). The proclamation of a relevant
area has the greatest impact on the Court's final resolution of the
dispute. As stated by the Court, "[g]eographical features are at the
heart of the delimitation process."33 This is especially true in this
29
30

Indicated on some charts as Petite Miquelon.
Supra note 4.

3 l R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law (Hingham, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1987) at 66.
3 2 M. R. Blakeslee, "The Distant Island Problem: The Arbitration on the
Delimitation of the Maritime Zones Around the French Collectivite Territoriale
of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon" (1991) 21 Ga. J. Int'! & Comp. L. 359 at 378.
33 Supra note 1 at 1160, para. 24.
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case, where the concept of proportionality seems to play a decisive
role. 34
The Court starts by noting that both parties agree that the relevant area is the approaches to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, namely the
concavity formed by the coasts of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.
The parties do not agree, however, on which coasts should be taken
account of to arrive at the total coastline lengths for Canada and St.
Pierre and Miquelon. These figures are of fundamental importance
as they are one of the two legs upon which proportionality rests, the
other being the relevant areas.
In the eyes of the Court the relevant coasts are the coast of Nova
Scotia from Cape Canso to Cape North, the dosing line across the
Cabot Strait from Cape North to Cape Ray, and almost the whole
southern coast of Newfoundland.3 5 All these "face the area where the
delimitation is required, generating projections that meet and
overlap" 36 those of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In particular, the Court
explains that the rational for including the Cabot Strait closing line
in the calculation is that it represents Canadian coasts that are less
than 400 NM away from St. Pierre and Miquelon and whose
projections would also therefore "meet and overlap."37
The portion of the Newfoundland coast which the Court excludes is that lying north and east of the islands, including the
closing line across Fortune Bay. The Court justifies this omission
by analogy to the north and east coasts of St. Pierre and Miquelon,
also excluded, which it says do not face on the area of dispute and
have already been taken into account by the 1972 opposite-coast
delimitation between points 1 and 9. 38 The logic of this determination is difficult to accept, as noted by Mr. Gotlieb the Canadian
judge in his dissent.3 9 The problem lies in the fact that not only do
the south and west coasts of Newfoundland that are excluded face
the area to be delimited, but there is no support for the idea that the
effect of one coast (here Newfoundland) is limited to delimiting
the boundary between it and the other coast (here the French
islands), such that it has no effect on the delimitation of the seaward
34 See discussion below.
35

Supra note 1 at 1161, paras. 28-30.

36 Ibid. at 1161, para. 29.
37

Ibid.

38 Ibid. at 1161, para. 30.
39

Ibid. at 1184-85, paras. 18-25.
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coast of the French islands. The Tribunal in the Anglo-French
Arbitration made it clear that the coastal zone of France could
leapfrog the Channel Islands and exist on their far side.4° However,
while the Court ignores this leapfrog effect with respect to
Newfoundland coasts facing the French islands, the Court accepts
this concept when it recognizes the existence of Canada's 200 NM
EFZ on the "far side" of the French zone where it must be created by
a leapfrogging effect (see Figure 2).
With regard to the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the
Court considers them to have a coast made up of two straight-line
segments: down the west coast of Miquelon all the way to the southwest corner of St. Pierre and from there to the south-east corner of
the island. 41 This contrasts with the Canadian position which
represented the St. Pierre and Miquelon coast as a single north-south
straight line segment.
The significance of the Court's decision not to follow the suggestion of the parties is twofold. First, the Canadian to French
coastline ratio, as calculated by the Court is 15.3:1, this contrasts to
ratios of 21 :1 and 6.5:1 put forward by Canada and France respectively.42 With a net change of only 68 NM in the Court's calculation
of coastal lengths from the Canadian position a significant change in
the ratios has been achieved via the questionable reasoning described
above. From this observation comes the second point, strongly lead
by Mr. Weil in his dissenting opinion, 43 that the calculation of
ratios based on coastal lengths is so open to variation so as to be an
exercise of discretion rather than law. For this reason, some have
seen recent delimitation decisions as limiting the role
proportionality should play while at the same time recognizing its
utility. 44
The final determination of the Court is that St. Pierre and
Miquelon are in a relationship of adjacency with the south coast of
Newfoundland. This is an important finding as there is a general
acceptance of the idea that equidistance is less applicable to lateral
Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 91-92, paras. 192-194.
Supra note I at 1162, para. 31.
Ibid at 1206, para. 24, note 19.
43 Ibid
44 I. Raileanu, "Equity in Maritime Boundary delimitations: The Gulf of
Maine Case" (1990-91) 14 Hastings Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 669 at 698; P. Weil,
The Law of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections. Maureen MacGlashan Trans.
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1989) at 75-79.
40
4!
42
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boundaries between adjacent coasts than it is to boundaries between
opposite ones.45
2. Terms of Reference and International Law
The second step the Court takes is an examination of the terms of
reference contained in the compromis. These terms create the Court,
delimit the question before it, and set the boundaries within which
the Court must operate. Two key terms shape the judgment are the
specification of the applicable rules which must govern the delimitation, and the requested result.
The rules which the court is to operate under are given in art.
2(1) of the compromis where it states that the Court shall come to a
decision "[r] uling in accordance with the principles of international
law applicable in the matter." 46 The requested result is given in arts.
2(1) and 2(2) where the court is asked to "establish a single
delimitation which shall govern all rights and jurisdiction which the
parties may exercise under international law" 47 and further that
"[t]he court shall describe the course of this delimitation in a technically precise manner."48
The second of the two key terms, the desired result, is straightforward and requires no elaboration by the Court. Canada and
France take the same road travelled by the United States and
Canada in the Gulf of Maine Case, 49 and look to the Court to produce a single boundary for both the water column and the seabed.
While the wisdom of this request is debatable, it places some important limits on the Court which are discussed later in this paper.
The Court identifies the fundamental principle of international
law to be applied to the case as one that "requires the delimitation
to be effected in accordance with equitable principles, or equitable
criteria, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in order to
achieve an equitable result."5o This is no more than a rewording by
4 5 0. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Kingston,
Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988) at 135; Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) judgement, IC) Rep. 1985 at 13, 47, para. 62 [hereinafter

Libya/Malta].
46 Compromis, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
47 Ibid art. 2(1).
48 Ibid art. 2(2).
49 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf ofMaine Area, judgement,
IC) Rep. 1984 at 246 [hereinafter the Gulf ofMaine Case].
50 Supra note 1 at 1163, para. 38.
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the Court of the "fundamental norm" enunciated by the Chamber in
the Gulf ofMaine Case. 51 As has been noted this is one, and perhaps
the only, true common denominator of every maritime delimitation.52
Two more findings which have a significant impact on the
shaping of the decision are made by the Court at this point. The
first of these is the rejection of the French contention that art. 6 of
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,53 which stipulates an
equidistance method, is applicable to the dispute. The Court's reasoning is lifted directly from the Chamber's decision in the Gulf of
Maine Case5 4 and emphasizes that conventional law having to do
with the continental shelf has no place in an all purpose delimitation; it would have the effect of making the water column above the
shelf "a mere accessory of the shelf."55 Moreover, the Court points
out that even if applicable, art. 6 is in no way a rule of equidistance
but rather a rule of equidistance and special circumstances.5 6
As this case and the Gulf of Maine Case are the only two examples of judicial "all purpose" delimitations,5 7 it is impossible to
draw a definitive conclusion but it is apparent that the accepted law
is that the 1958 Convention has no role to play in a single delimitation of both the shelf and water column.5 8
The second finding of the Court is that the decision of the
Tribunal in the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration with respect to the
treatment of the Channel Islands, where a 12 mile boundary was
created on the seaward side of the islands effectively enclaving
them,59 does not have precedential value with respect to the case at
hand. 60 The latter is distinguished on the grounds that there is no
proximate metropolitan French coast involved in the manner the
5!

GulfofMaine Case, supra note 49 at 300, para. 112.

52 Weil, supra note 44 at 160.
Supra note 11.
GulfofMaine Case, supra note 49 at 301-303, paras. 116-125.
Ibid. at 301, para. 119.
56 Supra note 1 at 1163, para. 41.
57 The boundary drawn in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case, 25 I.L.M. 252
(1986), was only in part a single all-purpose boundary.
53

54
55

58 However, this may not be true in the situation where the parties have agreed
to the construction of more than one boundary line where necessary. In such a
situation it is possible that art. 6 might be found to apply to the continental shelf
delimitation.
59 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 95, para. 202.
60 Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 42.
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English coast was with the Channel Islands. The Court holds that
because of this difference St. Pierre and Miquelon cannot be seen as
incidental features.
The Tribunal, however, was willing to treat the Channel Islands
as incidental features because they accepted France's argument that
not only were they on the "wrong side" of the median line but that
they were "wholly detached geographically from the United
Kingdom." 61 Ironically, on the basis of this argument France then
held up the 1972 Releve reached between itself and Canada as a
precedent for enclaving the Islands. It is true that the 1977 Tribunal
accepted this analogy with some reservations, noting that the two
situations were somewhat different, but in essence the Tribunal
found that the Channel Islands are distant islands in the same sense
as St. Pierre and Miquelon and thus were subject to being enclaved.
If an island grouping only tens of kilometres from its
metropolitan coast is "detached geographically," then one several
thousand of kilometres from its metropolitan coast must be as well.
Considered in this manner St. Pierre and Miquelon are even more
of an incidental feature than the Channel Islands are. The Court,
however, ignores this reasoning and rejects any similarity with the
Anglo-French Arbitration on the grounds that it involved "a delimitation between two mainland, and approximately commensurate,
coasts." 62
In discussing the applicable principles of international law, the
Court upholds the primacy of equitable principles and affirms the
limited role of equidistance in an all purpose delimitation. In
addition the Court rejects the precedential value of the 1977 AngloFrench Arbitration with respect to the possibility of enclaving remote islands, even though there is a stronger argument for such a
treatment of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
3. The Equitable Criteria
As the Court recognizes, it is in the choice of equitable principles or
equitable criteria that the two parties diverge. Not surprisingly
Canada and France suggest different equitable criteria from which
the Court can arrive at what each consider an equitable result. France
argued for the principle of sovereign equality of States and the
6l
62

Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 94, para. 199.
Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 42.
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principle that both mainland and island coasts have the equivalent
ability to generate coastal zones, and Canada argued for the
principles of non-encroachment and proportionality. For each principle the Court discusses the relevant law as well as the objections
of the opposing party.
i. Sovereign. Equality of States
This principle of sovereign equality of states is raised by France to
discount two Canadian arguments. The first of these two arguments
is that St. Pierre and Miquelon are entitled to no continental shelf
of their own as the islands are superimposed on the Canadian shelf.
This is a modification of the natural prolongation argument first
articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Case. 63 The Court rejects this approach,
adopting the reasoning of the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case.
the eastern shelf of North America is a physiographical continuum
which cannot be divided on a physical basis between nations. 64
Furthermore the Court emphasizes that the shelf is a juridical
concept, an argument first recognized in the Anglo-French
Arbitration. 65 This approach is now dominant and defines the shelf
by a distance measure instead of according to geo-morphological
factors. 66 As a juridical concept defined by distance, every coastal
State has an equal claim to a continental shelf. Finally, the Court
repeats its argument that as the parties have requested a single allpurpose delimitation, factors that pertain solely to the shelf are not
applicable. 6 7
The second argument raised by Canada is that the political nature of St. Pierre and Miquelon, as a dependent territory of France,
requires that it be treated in a different manner from an independent
State. In response, the Court accepts France's position that the
63 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Rep. 1969 3 [hereinafter The North Sea
Case].
6 4 GulfofMaine Case, supra note 49 at 273, para. 45; This line of argument was
first used by the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration to reject French
claims with regards to the Channel Islands, supra note 21 at 91, para. 193.
65 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 91, para. 191.
66 This practice has been codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 1261
(1982), and recognized in Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 33, para. 33.
67 Libya/Malta, supra note 45, Section II, "Terms of Reference and
International Law."
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equality of states demands that the French islands not be treated in
a prejudicial manner. 68 Firstly, the decision of the Court in this
regard disagrees with Canada's interpretation of the Libya/Malta
Case, correctly in this writer's view. 69 More importantly, the Court
distinguishes Canada's second argument based on the Anglo-French
Arbitration treatment of the Channel Islands7° by stating that all
coasts in the present case are non-independent island coasts, (i.e.
from a juridical viewpoint neither Newfoundland or Cape Breton
are considered part of mainland Canada any more than St. Pierre
and Miquelon are part of metropolitan France). While true in a
strict physical sense, a simple glance at any chart makes it clear that
Newfoundland (which politically includes Labrador) and Cape
Breton (politically, and by roadway, a integral part of Nova
Scotia) are in a fundamentally different situation than two islands
several thousand kilometres from their mainland coast. This
appears to be more a simple reluctance on the part of the Court to
"open a can of worms" by discussing political criteria, when an
equitable result based solely on geographical criteria is possible.
This approach is consistent with prior case-law that has generally
glossed over the finer points of political and socio-economic status
of islands in favour of geography.7 1

ii. The Equal Capacity ofIslands and Mainlands to Generate Zones
France asserts the equal capacity of islands and mainlands to generate coastal zones in order to rebut the Canadian contention that
coasts have relative capacities to generate zones proportionate to
their length. The Court rejects this, stating that a coast, no matter

68 Supra note 1at1165, paras. 48-52.
6 9 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 51,

para. 72 and also at 42, para. 53 where
political status is seen as a factor affecting geography. cf McDorman, supra note
13at187.
70 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 90, para. 190.
7l See generally treatment of islands in Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note
21; the Kerkennah Islands in the Tunisia/Libya Case, infra note 89; and Seal
Island in Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49. For commentary see J. Briscoe,
"Islands in Maritime Boundary Delimitation" (1988) 7 Oc. Y.B. 14 at 39; D.
Christie, "From the Shoals of Ras Kaboudia to the Shores of Tripoli: The
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Boundary Delimitation" (1983) 13 Ga. J. Int'!
& Comp. L. 1 at 28.
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how short, projects a 200 NM EEZ 72 and that the proper role for
proportionality is as an a posteriori test to ensure that a given result
is equitable. As discussed below, it is questionable whether the
Court in practice rejects this concept of "relative reach" to the extent it says.

iii. Non-Encroachment
This is the first of two equitable criteria put forward by Canada
and, as noted by the Court, is one outgrowth of the well established
natural prolongation principle.7 3 The Court seems to accept
Canada's argument that due to the concavity of the relative area, a
line based on equidistance would lead to excessive cutoff beyond
the southern coast of Newfoundland, the key coast due to the concept of frontal projections.
In dissent, Mr. Weil takes exception to this theory of frontal
projection stating that there is no basis for it at international law.
He argues that the concept of arcs of circles upon which most
boundary lines are constructed, that are in turn founded upon the
more ancient "cannon-shot rule," is evidence of a radial theory of
coastal projection.74
The difference between the two approaches seems to be more
apparent than real. Since any curve can be approximated by a large
enough set of straight lines, an identical result can be obtained from
either method, avoiding the absurd result suggested by Mr. Weil
for an L-shaped coast. 7 5 The concept of frontal projections simply
seems to support the point that a longer coast (disregarding indentations) must by necessity produce a zone of greater area than a
shorter coast, regardless of the method used.

iv. Proportionality as an Equitable Principle
The second equitable criteria put forward by Canada is that of proportionality, not merely as check on the equity of the final decision,
but as a criteria upon which to base that decision. In response, the
72 Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 45. Though not quoted, the basis for this is clearly
art. 121 (2) of LOSC, supra note 66, which states that islands generate zones in the
same manner as other land territory.
73 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 39, para. 46; Weil, supra note 44 at 62: "the nonencroachment principle lies at the very heart of the delimitation process."
74 Supra note 1at1201, paras. 12-14.
75

Ibid.
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Court reiterates its position that the proper use of proportionality is
the former and not the latter. 76 It sends mixed signals, however, by
quoting from the Libya/Malta Case wherein it is stated that:
It is however one thing to employ proportionality
calculations to check a result; it is another thing to take
note, in the course of the delimitation process, of the
existence of a very marked difference in coastal lengths,
and to at tribute the appropriate significance to that
coastal relationship, without seeking to define it in
quantitative terms which are only suited to the ex-post
assessment of relationship of coast to area. 77
This passage does not proscribe proportionality as an equitable criteria, instead it advocates limiting the use of proportionality to a
qualitative role. This contrasts with the quantitative role that proportionality assumes when used as a test of equitable results. Thus
by deliberately using this quote the Court appears to give with one
hand what it had just taken with the other, by first stating that proportionality should be used only as a quantitative check, and then
suggesting that it may also have a qualitative role.
In the end, the Court accepts all four equitable principles put
forward by Canada and France as at least relevant to the achievement of an equitable result. The analysis in the following section
will examine how these four criteria are used in the Court's solution, and to what extent any of them dominate the others.

4. The Court's Result
The Court states clearly that neither "of the proposed solutions
[Canada's or France's] provides even a starting point for the
delimitation."78 With this the Court rejects both equidistance and
an enclave as methods by which to implement the equitable criteria
it has identified.79

76 Ibid. at 1168, para. 63.
77 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 49, para. 66.
78

Supra note 1 at 1169, para. 65.

79 Note, however, that while not accepting a 12 NM zone around the islands as
proposed by Canada, the final boundary created by the Court is in fact an enclave;
France's zone is completely surrounded by the 200 NM EFZ of Canada.
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The Western Sector

The Court's solution lies in constructing two zones around the islands (see Figure 2). The first it labels the west sector, comprising
an area from point 9 of the 1972 delimitation to a point off the
south-west tip of St. Pierre. In discussing this sector, the Court underscores the importance of limiting the cut-off of Newfoundland's
south-coast projection by encroachment of any zone belonging to St.
Pierre and Miquelon. To this end the Court grants the islands a 24
NM zone by analogy to the contiguous zone spelled out in art. 33 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 80 Even this
amount is not fully given as the zone is not allowed to cross the
equidistance line where that line is less than 24 NM from the islands, a situation found in the north-west part of the sector. s1
The strangest aspect of this reasoning is that the Court approaches the problem from the perspective that the zone around St.
Pierre and Miquelon should encroach as little as possible on the
projection from south coast of Newfoundland, but not vice-versa!
This bias is evident when the Court states that:
A limited extension of the enclave beyond the territorial
sea in this western sector would meet to some degree the
reasonable expectations of France of title beyond the narrow belt of territorial sea, even if causing some en croachment to certain Canadian seaward projections. 82
Thus while the Canadian projection is protected from severe encroachment, the French projection does not seem to enjoy the same
privilege. This is at odds with the Court's acceptance of the principles of the sovereign equality of States and the equal ability of
mainland and island coasts to generate zones. These criteria mandate that equal weight be given to the concern of Canadian encroachment on French projections, yet nowhere in the majority
judgment is this recognized.
Mr. Prosper Weil, in dissent, is particularly outraged by this attitude which he interprets as an unjustified prejudice on the part of
the Court, towards France. It is not the Court's job, he asserts, to

80

U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter LOSC], reprinted in 21

I.L.M. 1261 (1982), supra note 1at1170, para. 69.
81
82

Ibid.
Ibid. 1170, para. 68.
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start from the axiomatic position that the whole of the region is
Canadian from which some portion should be assigned to France.83

ii. The Southern Sector
In the southern sector, there is no concern about encroachment as the
relevant coasts are parallel (leaving out for the moment any
consideration of Cape Breton). It is therefore possible to give St.
Pierre and Miquelon a full 200 NM zone to the south. The Court
calculates the width of the Southern zone as 10. 5 NM based on the
distance between the westernmost and easternmost points of the
island grouping.8 4 The Court makes no mention of why it does not
consider the length of the south coast it had previously defined, at
8.25 NM, as the basis for the corridor. Using this previously defined coastal length would seem a more logical choice given the
emphasis the Court places throughout the decision on the principle
that it is coasts that generate maritime zones.
The Court does not give a rationale for its delimitation of the
remainder of the southern sector, the area from the north-east tip of
the corridor to point 1 of the 1972 delimitation. It simply states
that "the delimitation shall be a twelve nautical miles limit measured from the nearest points on the baseline of the French islands." 85
No reasons are given as to why a 24 NM zone is not used here, as it
is in the western sector. There is no equidistance line to limit the
boundary, and no alternative explanation is put forward to limit the
French claim in this manner. It is this apparent arbitrariness of the
decision which most deeply concerns Mr. Weil. 86
With respect to the corridor, the Court is quick to dismiss any
argument that it is an encroachment on the projection of Cape
Breton. In the words of the Court, the coast of Cape Breton has
"open oceanic spaces for an unobstructed seawards projection towards the south ... the direction in which they face." 87 This comes
across as a somewhat original reworking of geography, as noted by
Mr. Gotlieb in dissent, 88 evidently to suit the ends of the Court.
From Cape North to Scatarie Island the coast follows a general
83 Ibid. 1203, para. 19.
84

Ibid. 1170, para. 71.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid. 1199 para. 7.
87

Ibid.171,para. 73.

88 Ibid. 1189, para. 41.
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south south-east direction and it is only from Scatarie Island to
Cape Canso that the coastal direction is south-west. Thus the majority has effectively ignored the seaward projection of Cape
Breton's coast from Cape North to Scatarie Island.
It is suggested that the true principle at work in this particular
instance is to be found in the separate opinion of Justice Jimenez de
Arechaga in the Tunisia/Libya Case where he states:
It is true that there may be geographical configurations in
which a boundary line cannot avoid "cutting across" the
coastal front of one State .... If the above-described geographical situation occurs, then the "cutting-off' effect
should be allowed to take place at a point as far as it may
be possible to go, seawards, from the coastal front of the
affected State [emphasis added].89

Applying this principle, the minimum cut-off is achieved by a
north-south corridor, deviation either west or east would involve
cut-off of Newfoundland's south coast.

5. A Return to Proportionality
The Court returns to proportionality at the end of its decision in
order to carry out the test that it feels is permitted by law when the
circumstances are appropriate, as it finds they are in this case.90 The
Court does this by comparing the proportionality of the coasts with
that of the areas as determined by the delimitation. Central to this
exercise is the determination of the relevant total area. The Court
deals with this in few short lines, finding the relevant area as not
just the Gulf Approaches but the much wider area defined loosely
by a 200 NM projection from the south-coast of Newfoundland and
from St. Pierre and Miquelon. In the result a ratio of 16.4: 1 is
arrived at, a figure that the Court compares favourably to its
coastline ratio of 15.3: 1.91
With this result the majority of the Court considers that an equitable result has been achieved. The two dissenting members however reach exactly the opposite conclusion, though for somewhat

89 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), judgement, ICJ Rep.
1982, 119, para. 69 [hereinafter Tunisia/Libya Case].
90 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 92.
91 Ibid. 1176, para. 93.
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different reasons. Mr. Weil's objections are those discussed earlier
having to do with the arbitrariness of deciding on a relevant area:
The identification and measurement of the relevant coasts
and the relevant area remind one of what has been said of
love, or of a Spanish inn; each one finds in them what he
brings to it. 92

This attitude, while expressed rather poetically, is borne out by the
dissent of Mr. Gotlieb who, while also disappointed in the
arbitrariness of the majority's determination of the relevant area,
suggests several different methods for arriving at what he considers
the "correct" relevant area. 9 3 It is a clear example of the
discretionary nature of proportionality, the calculation of widely
divergent relevant areas on what each person considers reasonable
grounds.
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS AND THE HIDDEN RATIO

1.

The Juridical Framework

There is a continuing debate among international jurists over what
the law of maritime delimitation actually consists of. It has been
suggested that true legal rules have not yet evolved and that decisions are on the whole decided ex aequo et bono.9 4 It is argued that
this is not only a trend in fact but is also a necessity of any given
maritime delimitation. Legal rules are not suited to the exercise of
maritime boundary delimitation as every problem occurs in a
unique geographical situation that calls for unique treatment and a
unique solution, a unicum.95
Perhaps one of the most helpful classifications of the law involved in delimitations has been put forward by Prosper Weil in his
non-judicial role as an international jurist. 96 Weil's classifications
are based on the degree of normative content in the approach used to
Ibid. 1206, para 24.
Ibid., see generally at 1186-88, paras. 26-37, specifically at 1188, para. 36
where Mr. Gotlieb considers that the relevant area can only consist of areas of
ocean that are "near" areas claimed by France.
9 4 L. D. M. Nelson, "The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime
Boundaries" (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'! L. 837; Johnston, supra note 45 at 247.
95 Nelson, ibid. 838-839.
96 Weil, supra note 44 at 159-167.
92

93
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reach a decision. At the lowest end of Weil' s classification scheme
are those decisions that are based solely on the "fundamental norm"
of an equitable result. In this approach, both the criteria and the
method to be used fall outside the legal sphere and the result is
determined by what will create an equitable result in the particular
problem at hand. This is the concept of the unicum carried to its
logical conclusion: what is equitable in one decision has no bearing
on what is equitable in the next.
Carrying out a delimitation via such an approach, it can be argued, is to truly proceed ex aequo et bono as the content of equity is
at the discretion of the adjudicator. Yet, insofar as equity is a legal
concept, international law is still being applied.97
In the middle of Weil' s scale is the approach that demands an
equitable result through the use of equitable criteria. With this approach, equity achieves a normative value to the extent that its contents are defined by the equitable criteria. However, since the
methods used to move from the criteria to the result are still outside of the "rules," and since what is to be considered an equitable
result is still at the discretion of the court, the end result of
applying this approach might well differ very little from a decision
based solely on the "fundamental norm" of an equitable result, save
to clothe the exercise in an air of objectivity. As the Chamber in the
Gulf of Maine Case observed: "for one and the same criterion it is
quite possible to arrive at different, or even opposite, conclusions in
different cases."98
The final classification is that of the highest normative content,
and exists when international law spells out the need not only for
equitable criteria leading to an equitable result, but also sets the
method(s) to move between the two. This approach is fundamentally different from the those described above as the court no longer
has the same freedom to arrive at any boundary it feels is
appropriate in the circumstances; rather it must follow the legal
method from a factual starting point and move toward a reasoned
conclusion. This method admits much less scope for judicial discretion.
An example of this approach is the mandatory application of
equidistance, followed by adjustments in the resulting boundary to
account for special circumstances. Mr. Weil is one of the strongest
97 Tunisia/Libya, supra note 89 at 60, para. 71.
98

GulfofMaine Case supra note 49 at 313, para. 358.
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advocates of this approach, 99 usually known as the combined rule,
which state practice has strongly endorsed though adjudicators have
not. 100

2. The Majority Judgment
On the face of it the majority judgment fits into the second category laid out above. The Court is at pains to justify its decision in
terms of the equitable criteria it has recognized. Yet, there is in the
present case a wide and obvious gap between the reasoning of the
majority, where it exists, and the result. If sovereign equality of
States is an applicable criteria, where did it disappear to? If nonencroachment is of such importance, why is the coast of Cape Breton
ignored as far as it impinges on the corridor? What rationale can
there be for the 12 NM limit between point 1 of the 1972
Agreement and the north-east corner of the corridor? In the words of
Jimenez de Arechaga:
Often, even, a regrettable but doubtless inevitable gap can
be observed between the arguments expounded in a
judicial decision and the concrete finding as regards the
choice of delimitation line adopted .... The finest legal
dissertations on equity will never succeed in completely
eliminating what is perhaps an irreducible core of the judicial subjectivism .... 101

It seems clear that either the true rationale behind the judgment
is an overriding criteria of proportionality, in denial of the Court's
express position to the contrary, or after arriving at what it considers an equitable result, the court is attempting an a posteriori application of equitable criteria to justify its decisions. In truth, it is
hard to separate these two positions. Jimenez de Arechaga stated in
his separate opinion in the Libya/Malta Case.
In the writer's eyes, there can be no equity without proportionality. The principle of proportionality, with that

Supra note 1at1209-13, paras. 30-37.
G. J. Tanja, The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries
(Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1990) at 299-300.
10 1 Tunisia/Libya, Separate Opinion of Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 89 at
90, para37.
99

IOO
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of equivalence and finality, is one of the three principles
on which equity is built. 102
Thus, if the boundary is arrived at for no other reason than because it
appears equitable in the eyes of the court, proportionality is still a
factor in arriving at that view.
A theory that would explain the piecemeal application of other
listed criteria is the overriding application of proportionality, but
if proportionality is the key to the decision, why is the Court so unwilling to acknowledge this fact in its reasons? Perhaps because the
preponderance of judicial opinion has dismissed proportionality as
an equitable criteria. 103 Weil picks up on this in his dissent, and
makes much of the fact that the majority bases its decision on criteria other than proportionality:
[E]ven though in some quarters some may think there is an
impression that this is how the majority of the court
approached the problem, the fact remains-and this alone
matters from the legal standpoint-that the proportionality between the lengths of the coastlines and the
corresponding maritime areas is not the only factor on
which the Decision bases its solution ....
. . . [T]he decision is drafted with unfailing orthodoxy
with regard to proportionality, since it does not make
proportionality the operative principle for purposes of the
delimitation and since the line drawn is not claimed to
be a proportionality line. One cannot but welcome this
fact.104

It is disappointing that if proportionality was the underlying
criteria it was not articulated as such. Certainly this approach is
open to the charge that the Court rendered a decision ex aequo et
bono, but to have done so would have recognized what surely is one
of the axiomatic tenants of maritime delimitation, the principle of
the unicum. 105 Every delimitation is a unique problem, not only in
102 Libya/Malta, Separate Opinion of Ruda, Bedjaoui, Jimenez de Arechaga,
supra note 45 at 84, para. 23.
103 See Raileanu, supra note 44 at 696-698; McDorman, supra note 13 at 182-

183.
104

Supra note 1 at 47, para. 20 and at 52, para. 26.

105 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 290, para. 81. See Libya/Malta, supra

note 45 at 39 where the ICJ states: "[Equity's] application should display
consistency and a degree of predictability."
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the geographical sense but also considering the associated political,
sociological, economic, and ecological factors. While a general set
of rules applicable to most if not all situations is seen by many as a
more secure approach and one more aptly suited to the concept of
international law, 106 it is in truth ill-suited to the practice of maritime delimitation. As L. D. M. Nelson states:
[E]ver since the introduction of the doctrine of the continental shelf it has been maintained that the "infinite variety" of geographical situations effectively rules out the
application of a general rule .... The persistence of this
viewpoint leads one to conclude that the law here seems
to be faced with a stubborn fact of nature. Inevitably, it
will be the law that will have to accommodate itself to
this phenomenon, perhaps shedding in the process what
some consider its most fundamental characteristic, its
universality, at least as far as a the delimitation of maritime boundaries is concerned.107

One need look no further than state practice to find evidence of
the need for flexibility and compromise that maritime
delimitation demands. 108 The functional approach is an example of
a dispute resolution framework that recognizes these realities and
attempts to address them.
V. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The functional approach to maritime boundary delimitation is a recent development in the law of the sea and has been advocated
primarily by Doug Johnston. 109 The heart of this approach is the
recognition that maritime boundaries are primarily "resource-oriented rather than area-oriented." 110 A few simple examples include
l06 See generally Weil, supra note 44; Johnston, supra note 45.
107 Nelson, supra note 94 at 842.
l08 Examples include the Australia-Papua New Guinea Torres Strait Treaty,
18 1.1.M. 291 (1979); Iceland-Norway: Agreement on the Continental Shelf
Boundary Between Iceland and fan Mayen, 21 1.1.M. 1222 (1982); the
Netherlands-Venezuela 197 8 Boundary Accord, Limits in the Seas, No. 105
(1986); the French-Venezuelan 1980 Boundary Accord, 1983 Recueil des Traites
No. 6(13); the 1971 Italy-Tunisia Agreement, Limits in the Seas, No. 89 (1980).
l09 K. P. Beauchamp, "The Management Function of Ocean Boundaries" (1986)
23 San Diego L. Rev. 611; Johnston, supra note 45.
HO Beauchamp, Ibid. at 630.
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the British objection to the Norwegian practice of straight
baselines; the North Sea continental shelf delimitation between
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands; and the Gulf of Maine
delimitation between Canada and the United States. In each of
these cases the true dispute was over the partitioning of resources in
the disputed area, whether it be fish, oil, or scallops. The aim of the
functional approach is to arrive at a solution to the delimitation
problem which deals with the conflict over exploitation of the resource(s) in question. To quote Beauchamp: "Boundaries drawn on a
functional basis anticipate purposes and consequences." 111 In short the
aim is to have form follow function, not geography.
In contrast, the "legal" approach analyzed in the previous section
focuses solely on geography to the exclusion of almost all other
factors. 112 The Court is quick to emphasize that "economic dependence and needs were not taken into account in the process of
delimitation." 113 This is not to say that all non-geographic factors
are ignored but the exceptions tend to be limited to security and
shipping concerns. 114 The rationale behind such a limiting rule is
twofold. First, the courts are not seen as having sufficient expertise
in these areas, and second, to allow such considerations would remove all certainty from the delimitation process by moving away
from accepted normative values and instead applying a unicum approach.115
It should be emphasized that not all disputes are open to a
functional interpretation. A classic example of one which at least
started off in this category is the Beagle Channel dispute between
Argentina and Chile. Though resources, specifically oil and gas,
came to play a key role, the problem was in essence territorial and
political in nature.116

Ill
112

Ibid.

See general discussion in Weil, supra note 44 at 258-264 and McDorman,
supra note 13 at 184. Concerning the exclusion of economic development
arguments in particular see Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 41, para. 50.
113 Supra note 1 at 1173, para. 83.
114 See Weil, supra note 44 at 264-66.
ll5 Supra note 1 at 1212, para. 36; Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 90, paras. 35-37.
116 See generally F. V., Comment, "The Beagle Channel Affair" (1977) 71 Am.
J. Int'! L. 733, and Johnston, supra note 45 at 192-196.
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1. The Dispute From a Functional Perspective
In its emphasis on the function of boundaries, the functional approach stresses the importance of negotiation over third party adjudication. With third party adjudication, invariably greater emphasis is placed on legal rules and issues rather than the functional
issues at the heart of the boundary dispute. 11 7
Recognition of the importance of negotiation can be found in
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf118 and the LOsc,119
both emphasize that negotiation is the preferred method of
resolving boundary disputes/delimitations. As has been pointed out
by Russell, 120 both Canada and France seemed well aware of the
advantage of a negotiated solution, and pursued this avenue until the
late 1980s. However, when a decision was made to send the dispute
to a Court of Arbitration the countries deliberately limited the
role of the Court, both by demanding that a single boundary be
established for the shelf and the water column and by asking the
Court to follow principles of international law. The second
condition effectively limits the Court to considering geographical
factors while ignoring the functional concerns. 121 The first condition
meanwhile severely curtails the extent to which any solution can
address both of the fundamentally different management concerns
of the two resources in dispute: fisheries, and oil & gas. One
resource being highly migratory in nature while the other is at fixed
locales on the seabed.
Johnston and Saunders have commented on the greater flexibility inherent in arbitration as compared to the ICJ (or a chamber
thereof) . 122 This arises because the parties to a dispute are free to
establish any terms of reference they see fit for an arbitral tribunal:
they are not bound by the strictures of international law. Having
said that, it is clear that in the present dispute Canada and France
Johnston, supra note 45 at 237.
Supra note 11, art. 6.
l19 Supra note 80, arts. 15, 74, 83.
120 D. Russell, "International Ocean Boundary Issues and Management
Arrangements" Vander Zwaag, ed., Canadian Ocean Law and Policy (Markham,
Ont.: Butterworths Canada, 1992) 463 at 487.
121 Supra previous section.
122 D. Johnston & P. Saunders, "Ocean Boundary Issues and Developments in
Regional Perspective" in D. Johnston & P. Saunders, eds., Ocean Boundary
Making: Regional Issues and Developments (New York: Croom Helm, 1988) 313
at 338.
117
118
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deliberately limited the discretion of the Court via the terms of
reference by mandating the application of principles of
international law. By limiting the terms in this way it appears as
though the parties have attempted to achieve a procedure with
somewhat predictable, and especially dispositive, results. Such an
approach is attractive because it permits los politicos to return to
their constituents with a judgment in their pockets and the problem
apparently solved.

2. The Decision From a Functional Perspective
The need to arrive at a functional solution has lead Johnston to emphasize the desirability of constructs such as shared management
zones to accompany any boundary delimitation. This is the concept
of settlement and arrangement: a given decision should not only
lead to a settlement of the boundary based on relevant criteria
(those at the heart of the boundary's function) but should also provide for a functional arrangement, usually some type of cooperative
management agreement. 123 Such an arrangement may be integral to
the settlement, but it is more often the case that it must be negotiated separately at a later date. It is for this reason that a boundary arrived at through third party adjudication is often only the first
step in arriving at a functional solution. 124
As noted, the parties ruled out the possibility of the Court arriving at a functional solution directly. It remains to be seen what
evidence can be found in the decision of the Court nonetheless attempting to recognize the functional philosophy, both in terms of a
consideration of relevant factors and with regards to an arrangement
to accompany the settlement. 12 5
As between Canada and France there is no question that it was
serious disagreements over resource exploitation and management,
in particular the cod fisheries, 126 that were at the heart of the dispute.
Johnston, supra note 45 at 228.
Russell, supra note 120 at 489.
At least one member of the majority, Oscar Schachter, has written on such
functional themes as regional cooperation and international organization. See
0. Schachter, Sharing the World's Resources (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1977).
126 Though certainly given less weight on the face of it, the hydrocarbon
resource is undoubtedly of longer term interest to France, a country with almost
total dependence on foreign oil. See generally N. Lucas, Western European
Energy Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 1-62.
123

124
125
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Although oil & gas exploration concerns initiated the debate, it was
the inability of the parties to agree on management of the cod
fishery that led ultimately to the Court of Arbitration. The Court
is willing to recognize this fact 127 but limits itself to applying the a
posteriori test set out by the Chamber in the Gulf ofMaine Case: the
delimitation should not be so radically inequitable so as to lead to
catastrophic economic repercussions for one of the parties
concerned. 128
The Court states that the delimitation will not have a radical
impact as the 1972 Agreement will still govern the fishery resource
between the two countries. 129 Of course, in saying this the Court is
forced to acknowledge the problems which have been encountered
by the two countries in applying this agreement, but the Court goes
on to state:
This Court is confident that by abiding in good faith
with the 1972 Agreement, the Parties will be able to
manage and exploit satisfactorily the fishing resources of
the area. 130

This appears to be the Court's response to any argument for an
"arrangement:" the 1972 Agreement is already in place, and all it
requires is the parties' cooperation.
As for considering relevant functional criteria in delimiting the
boundary, criteria based on ecological, biological, and socio-economic factors, the Court expressly denies taking them into account.131 These protestations are suspect, however, when one considers the dominant role that proportionality seems to have played
in arriving at a solution. It is difficult to imagine how a consideration of the proportionality of certain geographical factors (such as
disproportionate coastal lengths) cannot help but snare certain associated socio-economic factors related to the resource in question
(e.g. more coast = more coastal communities = greater population =
more of a demand on the resource). In addition, considering the gap
between reasons and result, and the express recognition of the
fisheries as an area of concern, it would seem naive to argue that such
factors did not enter into the Court's consideration.
127 Supra note 1at1173-74, paras. 83-87.
128 GulfofMaine Case, supra note 49 at 342, para. 237.
129 Supra note 1 at 1174, para. 87.
130

Ibid

131 Supra note 1 at 1173, para. 83.
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Nonetheless, on the face of it the Court abides by the terms of
reference that preclude any recourse to a functional approach. It is
satisfied with using the broad brush of proportionality to justify its
conclusions, while at the same time emphasizing to the parties the
need to cooperate in their continuing implementation of the 1972
Agreement.
Such a conclusion, however, is insufficient to fully explain the
strange shape of the boundary which the Court arrives at. Certainly
the area is dictated by proportionality, but there is evidence of another concern in the construction of the shape of the delimited area,
specifically in the creation of the 200 NM corridor. It is not
difficult to imagine that this feature raises serious fisheries
management concerns, particularly for Canada. The corridor
represents a 10.5 NM wide swath of French jurisdiction where the
French are free to fish at will. An endangered cod stock that
transverses the boundaries of the original disputed area will traverse
this zone. On the French side, a corridor only 10.5 NM wide makes
the probability of violating the boundary during fishing operations
very high. In short, the existence of the corridor will require either a
ridiculous level of scrutiny to enforce and avoid confrontation, or
the two countries will be forced to adopt a more cooperative stance,
an imperative that the Court has recognized. It is suggested that it
is with this functional result in mind that the Court has set the shape
of the boundary. 132
If this is true, has the Court, albeit through indirect means,
reached a functional solution? Johnston and Saunders have the following to say about the required test:
The new conceptual framework for ocean boundary making should require the analyst to ask one all-important
question: is the boundary functional or dysfunctional? 133

It is suggested that within the limits imposed by the parties, the
decision of the Court is functional to the degree that it favours the
possibility of a cooperative management of the fisheries. However,
considering the history of the dispute there is likely an equal, if not
greater, probability that relations between Canada and France will
spiral even further downwards. There is certainly no evidence to
132 This possibility was brought to the attention of the author through
communication with D. Johnston.
133 Johnston & Saunders, supra note 122 at 332.
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suggest that a new day of cooperation has dawned between these two
nations. 134
With respect to oil & gas resources in the region, there is no
evidence to suggest any recognition by the Court of the concerns
surrounding their future management and exploitation. Indeed, the
Court states that it "has no reason to consider the potential mineral
resources as having a bearing on the delimitation." 13 5 This seems a
cavalier attitude to take when in the eyes of many, the main reason
that France has remained committed to St. Pierre and Miquelon is
not because of the fishery but rather the potential hydrocarbon reserves beneath the shelf.136
However, the reasoning applied above with respect to the corridor and the fisheries may be equally applicable to the hydrocarbon resource. While it is true that some of the profitable reserves
may be located under that part of the shelf caught by the corridor, it
is likely that any field in the area will straddle the boundary. This
suggests that any future development of a given straddling field
will involve exploitation by both countries, thus increasing the probability of cooperative management of the resource.
Evidence of the willingness of the two parties to compromise on
this issue is somewhat more conspicuous than it is with the fisheries.
While summarily dismissed by the Court, 137 the significance of the
Releve is not minimal. It is an indication of the importance that
France ascribes to the hydrocarbon resources that they were willing
to concede large areas of their continental shelf claim (most of
which has no oil & gas potential) in return for exploration and exploitation guarantees. This indicates that a negotiated settlement in
this area may be possible. In light of this, it is disappointing that
the Court did not, at a minimum, stress the need for cooperative
management of both fisheries and hydrocarbon resources.

l34 For a single example among many, see John C. Crosbie, Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-HQ-93-04, (14 January 1993),
commenting on French misinformation on reduced cod quotas.
135 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 89.
I36 McDorman, supra note 13 at 161; M-C. Aquarone, French Marine Policy in
the 1970s and 1980s, 19 Oc. Dev. & Int'! L. 267 at 276 (1988); Gass, J.D. The
French Claim to the Eastern North American Continental Shelf, 27 JAG J. 367 at
384 (1973).
137 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 91.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The decision of the majority of the Court of Arbitration in the
Canada-France maritime boundary dispute claims to be based on
the application of equitable criteria to arrive at an equitable result.
The four listed equitable criteria are the sovereign equality of
states; the equal ability of island and mainland coasts to generate
coastal zones; and the principle of non-encroachment. Of these the
principle of non-encroachment is relied upon primarily to limit the
entitlement of France to an EEZ, in apparent defiance of the
principle of sovereign equality.
The Court rejects both an equidistance line as a starting point as
well as a limited enclave around the islands. In their place the
Court constructs a two-sector boundary consisting of a 24 NM zone
about the western side of St. Pierre and Miquelon and a 200 NM
long 10.5 NM wide corridor extending to the south of the islands.
The result is justified as being equitable through a comparison of
the proportionality of coastal lengths to resulting areas.
The apparent degree of inconsistency on the face of the judgment forces one to conclude that the Court arrives at its decision
using proportionality as the unstated, but overriding criterion. Such
an approach is very close to the line separating equity as a legal
norm from a decision rendered ex aequo et bono. In following this
path the Court implicitly applies the concept of the unicum, and accepts the limitation this imposes on the application of normative
rules of maritime delimitation law.
An alternative to the classical mode of maritime boundary delimitation is the functional approach. With this method the aim of
the delimitation exercise is to arrive at a boundary that is assessed
not on territorial concerns but rather on the resources that form the
basis for the boundary's function.
When viewed in light of the functional approach, the decision of
the majority reflects an effort, within the bounds set by the parties,
to arrive at both a settlement and an arrangement (by creating a
boundary configuration that encourages cooperation between the
parties in the management of both the marine and hydrocarbon resources).
Like the jurisprudence that has preceded it, this decision will be
a disappointment to those with a unitarian view of international law.
Notwithstanding several limited exceptions, the Court does not
take a declarative role towards the rules of law to be applied to
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maritime boundary delimitation. Once again, the unique nature of
this type of exercise has forced a Court to exercise flexibility in order to satisfy "the primordial requirement of achieving an overall
equitable result."138

138

Tunisia/Libya, supra note 89 at 82, para. 114

